COLD WAR WRITINGSThe Long Telegram and the X-Article
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In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.[1]
The Long Telegram
The achievement for which George Kennan is most widely known, The Long Telegram, is one that must be considered in depth. The timing of this telegram from Kennan to the State Department is significant. On February 9, 1946, Joseph Stalin gave a speech emphasizing the perils of capitalism which was interpreted by many in the public of the United States as a threat of war.[2] Harriman, was leaving his position, which left Kennan temporarily in charge.[3] He encouraged Kennan to be truthful about his concerns.[4] The State Department requested information from the embassy on Soviet behavior on behalf of the Treasury Department because of the Soviet lack of cooperation in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.[5] Kennan took the response upon himself and created an 8,000 word telegram detailing Soviet beliefs and policies and how this affected the United States. From his previously small diplomatic role, he was finally given the opportunity to share his full beliefs and felt that “it would not do to give them just a fragment of the truth.”[6]
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Translation of Stalin's 1946 Speech. Document Courtesy of the Wilson Center.
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This response was famously given the name the “Long Telegram” and was considered by Clark Clifford, future author of the Clifford-Elsey Report and Secretary of Defense under President Johnson, to be “probably the most important, and influential, message ever sent to Washington by an American diplomat.”[7] This telegram discussed the outlook of the Soviet Union and how these views would be implemented. He emphasized that “if Soviet power is to be secure” it would require “our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken.”[8] Kennan emphasized the inability for there to be positive lasting relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and that instead the US needed to focus on ensuring its own strength and encouraging a better system in other countries.[9] This telegram circulated widely throughout the government, mainly spearheaded by James Forrestal, the Secretary of the Navy, who made it mandatory reading in top positions in the government.[10]
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal. Image Courtesy of the Truman Library.
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The X-Article
The full "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" document can be read here. Courtesy of CVCE.
George Kennan. Image Courtesy of Britannica.
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A less talked about, but still significant follow-up to the Long Telegram was the X-Article, also written by George Kennan. This paper was originally written as an essay only for Forrestal which discussed Soviet policies and their implications on those of the United States.[11] At the same time, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of Foreign Affairs, reached out to Kennan requesting a similar piece of writing. Kennan was given permission both from Forrestal and the State Department’s Committee on Unofficial Publication to send the same essay to Armstrong to be published anonymously under the name ‘X’ and officially titled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”.[12] Within a month, Kennan’s identity as the author was leaked by columnist Arthur Krock who had seen the original essay sent to Forrestal and realized who wrote it.[13] In this article, Kennan wrote “…it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”[14] This led to widespread belief of containment as a doctrine and Kennan was credited as its main founder. Newspapers reported about the X-Article as “an unofficial exposition of America’s attitude toward Russia.”[15] Kennan was not expecting such a response to his writing and afterwards lamented its popularity because of the many misinterpretations made by the public.[16]
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Kennan later acknowledged three major challenges in his writing when shared with such a large audience. The first was a lack of information about the rest of Eastern Europe which Kennan afterwards attributed to the fact that the article was meant only for Forrester and was not originally written to cover everything about this issue.[17] He was also not clear enough in explaining that this policy of containment was only designed for the current Soviet Union and he was not claiming that it would necessarily be effective in other parts of the world.[18] Kennan was most concerned about the public perception that containment involved the use of military force, when he was specifically talking about containment through political means.[19] Walter Lippman was a primary critic of the article and wrote fourteen different columns highlighting his grievances.[20] He viewed the X-Article as supporting a military containment, and instead suggested ideas that Kennan agreed were much more similar to those he meant to convey.[21] In addition, Lippmann also brought up new suggestions for strategy towards other European countries that Kennan admitted inspired more of his later writings.[22]
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Walter Lippmann. Image Courtesy of the Nieman Reports.
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However, Kennan’s containment policy really spiraled out of his control in people’s attempts to continue the policy past its intended period and to apply it to other situations. Kennan’s initial strategy was in response to unsuccessful US concessions to the USSR and proposed a temporary focus on containing the political spread of communism to neighboring Eastern European countries. Kennan wanted to continue this policy until the Soviet Union faced enough weakness in its own system that it was forced to negotiate with the United States and collaborate on a more permanent world older.[23] At that point, containment would no longer be an effective or necessary strategy for the US. The reasons that some cite for containment being a failure are not because of the initial policy but because it was not succeeded by the necessary next strategy. The US government missed important chances for negotiations with the USSR because of its focus on military containment.[24] The policy also lost much of his original intentions when people tried to apply it to communism in China. Kennan refused to take ownership of “any efforts to invoke that doctrine today in situations to which it has, and can have, no proper relevance.”[25] Kennan continued to critique the policy after the end of the Cold War because it had not gone as efficiently and quickly as he had hoped when forming it.[26]
Footnotes:
[1] X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4 (July 1947): 566–82, https://doi.org/10.2307/20030065, 575
[2] George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 604.
[3] George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown, and Company, 1967), 292.
[4] John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life (New York: Penguin, 2012), 217.
[5] Kennan, Memoirs, 292
[6] Kennan, Memoirs, 293
[7] Peter Grose, Operation rollback: America’s secret war behind the iron curtain (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2000), 4. [Google Books]
[8]George F Kennan, “The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State,” U.S. Department of State, February 22, 1946, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v06/d475.
[9]Kennan, Chargé in the Soviet Union
[10] Kennan, Memoirs, 295
[11] Kennan, Memoirs, 354
[12] Kennan, Memoirs, 355
[13] Kennan, Memoirs, 356
[14]X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct"
[15] “What is US Policy Toward Russia?,” Daily Boston Globe, July 13, 1947, https://dickinson.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/what-is-us-policy-toward-russia/docview/839456518/se-2..
[16] Kennan, Memoirs, 357
[17] Kennan, Memoirs, 357-358
[18] Kennan, Memoirs, 359
[19] Kennan, Memoirs, 358
[20] Gaddis, 273
[21] Kennan, Memoirs, 360
[22] Kennan, Memoirs, 360
[23] Kennan, Memoirs, 364-365
[24] Kennan, Memoirs, 365
[25] Kennan, Memoirs, 367
[26] Gaddis, 249
[1] X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4 (July 1947): 566–82, https://doi.org/10.2307/20030065, 575
[2] George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 604.
[3] George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown, and Company, 1967), 292.
[4] John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life (New York: Penguin, 2012), 217.
[5] Kennan, Memoirs, 292
[6] Kennan, Memoirs, 293
[7] Peter Grose, Operation rollback: America’s secret war behind the iron curtain (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2000), 4. [Google Books]
[8]George F Kennan, “The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State,” U.S. Department of State, February 22, 1946, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v06/d475.
[9]Kennan, Chargé in the Soviet Union
[10] Kennan, Memoirs, 295
[11] Kennan, Memoirs, 354
[12] Kennan, Memoirs, 355
[13] Kennan, Memoirs, 356
[14]X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct"
[15] “What is US Policy Toward Russia?,” Daily Boston Globe, July 13, 1947, https://dickinson.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/what-is-us-policy-toward-russia/docview/839456518/se-2..
[16] Kennan, Memoirs, 357
[17] Kennan, Memoirs, 357-358
[18] Kennan, Memoirs, 359
[19] Kennan, Memoirs, 358
[20] Gaddis, 273
[21] Kennan, Memoirs, 360
[22] Kennan, Memoirs, 360
[23] Kennan, Memoirs, 364-365
[24] Kennan, Memoirs, 365
[25] Kennan, Memoirs, 367
[26] Gaddis, 249